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Abstract
Researchers have found that voting can help increase voluntary contributions to a public 
good—provided enforcement through a third party. Not all collective agreements, however, 
guarantee third-party enforcement. We design an experiment to explore whether a voting 
rule with and without endogenous punishment increases contributions to a public good. 
Our results suggest that voting by itself does not increase cooperation, but if voters can 
punish violators, contributions increase significantly. While costly punishment increases 
contributions at the price of lower efficiency, overall efficiency for a voting-with-
punishment rule still exceeds the level observed for a voting-without-punishment rule. 
Todd L. Cherry, Stephan Kroll, and Jason F. Shogren (2007) "Voting, Punishment, and Public 
Goods" Economic Inquiry Vol. 45, No. 3 pp.557–570 Version of Record Available From 
(www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com)
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines whether a nonbinding
vote promotes cooperation in a linear public-
good experiment. The vote is nonbinding
because no third-party authority exists to
enforce the voting outcome. We also examine
how cooperation increases when voters punish
thosewho do not adhere to the voting outcome.
The motivation behind examining voting
institutions in public-good settings is that in
many real-world situations people work as
a collective to set policy rules to manage com-
mon property and to assign individual contri-
butions to public goods, for example, summits
of international organizations, environmental
quality councils, or school board meetings.
Rather than choosing between cooperation
versus noncooperation or selecting an individ-
ual level of contribution, people in large
groups frequently use a voting procedure to
coordinate their efforts. Most experimental
research on public or common goods, how-
ever, has focused on individual decisions
rather than voting rules.1 Walker et al.
(2000) (WGHO) are an exception. They were
the first to consider the efficiency implications
of a combined common-property-with-voting
allocation scheme in the laboratory. Group
members voted on a proposal over how much
everybody should contribute to the common
good. All votes were binding, and a third-
party authority guaranteed all voters abided
by the majority proposal.2 Their evidence
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ABBREVIATION
WGHO: Walker, Gardner, Herr, and
Ostrom
1. For overviews, see, for example, the books by
Ostrom (1990) and Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner
(1994) and the survey articles by Ostrom (1998, 2000),
Ledyard (1995), and Fehr and Gächter (2000a).
2. Footnote 4 in WGHO: ‘‘Note that the setting we
investigate assumes the existence of an authority with
the power to implement an adopted rule.’’ This assump-
tion is not important for the focus of their investigation,
which is rather what kind of rule will be adopted than
whether a rule will be adopted and obeyed or not.
suggests that people cooperate more with per-
fectly enforced voting rules relative to a no-
vote scheme.3
We believe it is important to examine the
effect of relaxing the assumption of perfect
enforcement since not all common-property
or public goods have such an external author-
ity to guarantee enforcement of a proposal
agreed on by majority rule. For instance,
international environmental treaties between
sovereign nations suffer from frail enforce-
ment mechanisms (see Barrett 2003). The
Kyoto protocol over climate change is the
prime example. Within the protocol, no
third-party mechanism exists to enforce the
attainment of the carbon reduction targets
and timetables for the sovereign signatory
nations (e.g., members of the European
Union, Japan). Smaller scale common-prop-
erty goods like fisheries and irrigation com-
munities do have supra authorities de jure,
but de facto these external authorities can
either be disinterested or lack the resources
to monitor, enforce, and sanction any policy
rule (Dolsak and Ostrom 2003). Evidence
from the field suggests that these regimes
are better built and enforced endogenously
within the collective (see the overview in
Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1994, chapter
12). Ostrom (1990, p. 94) notes that ‘‘[i]n these
robust institutions, monitoring and sanctions
are undertaken not by an external authority
but rather by the participants themselves.’’
An institution with many participants, how-
ever, can generate the need for a formal insti-
tutional mechanism such as voting, as
opposed to a pure face-to-face communica-
tion system (WGHO). This voting might be
nonbinding per se, but informal social sanc-
tions defined by the collective can help enforce
the voting outcomes (e.g., a small financial
penalty coupled with reputation loss). Ostrom
(1990, see Table 5.2, p. 180) reviewed 15 self-
organized collectives around the globe, and
her results suggest that these sanctions seem
to be a necessary condition for robust institu-
tional performance.
Experimental research on the effects of
nonbinding voting and voting with little
consequence has generated ambiguous
results.4 Some evidence suggests that majority
voting ‘‘brings everybody on the same page’’
or generates a social norm. Feld and Tyran
(2002) observed in their tax experiments that
a fine on tax evasion endogenously agreed
on bymajority vote resulted in higher tax com-
pliance than an exogenously determined fine
(or no fine at all). Tyran (2004) found that vot-
ers tend to agree to a costly proposal if they
expect that others will approve as well. Voting
on policies that do not change the Nash equi-
librium in public goods games also influences
overall contribution levels (Sutter and Weck-
Hannemann 2004; Tyran and Feld 2006). In
contrast, Messer, Kaiser, and Schulze (2005)
found that voting by itself had little effect
on contributions in their public-good experi-
ments.
We are interested in more than nonbinding
voting—we also consider whether adding
explicit opportunities to punish those who
do not abide by the majority vote can reduce
the inefficiencies that arise from imperfect
enforcement. We introduce a punishment
mechanism into a public-good-with-voting
experiment. By combining a punishment
mechanism with the voting rule, we bring into
play Ostrom’s (2000) observation that three
types of subjects inhabit public-good and
common-property experiments—‘‘conditional
cooperators’’ and ‘‘willing punishers,’’ in addi-
tion to the standard ‘‘rational egoists.’’ Con-
ditional cooperators initiate cooperation
only when they expect others to reciprocate.5
Willing punishers will bear some private cost
to sanction others. In our voting-with-punish-
ment environment, cooperation could increase
since conditional cooperators should go along
with a nonbinding majority vote because they
expect rational egoists to contribute now to
avoid being punished by the willing punishers.
In a related (no-vote) public-good game, Fehr
andGächter (2000b) observed that cooperation
3. Margreiter, Sutter, and Dittrich (2005) found that
homogeneous groups as in WGHO are more likely to
reach an efficient outcome than heterogeneous groups
in an equivalent situation.
4. In a sense, nonbinding voting resembles cheap talk,
which has also generated ambiguous effects: while some
researchers have observed no or very limited effect of
cheap talk in several experimental studies (e.g., Cason
and Gangadharan 2002; Kroll, Mason, and Shogren
1998), others found that cheap talk can increase cooper-
ation even when the equilibriums of the game are subop-
timal (e.g., Croson, Boles, and Murnighan 2003; Duffy
and Feltovich 2002; Ostrom 2000).
5. In a one-shot public game experiment, Fischbacher,
Gächter, and Fehr (2001) found that around 50% of their
subjects were conditional cooperators.
rates increased substantially when the willing
punishers had the opportunity to punish. They
found that just the threat to punish can be
enough to coerce others to cooperate (espe-
cially in later rounds), without even exercising
the threat.6,7
Punishment had also some effect in Bochet,
Page, and Putterman (2006), but they ob-
served that the two influential forms of
communication—face-to-face and chat room
communication—had a bigger impact on
cooperation than giving the subjects punish-
ment opportunities without communication.
Cooperation was still significantly greater in
a treatment with punishment opportunities
(and without any communication) compared
to the baseline treatment without punishment
or communication.8
In a setup similar to Fehr and Gächter,
Masclet et al. (2003) compared monetary and
nonmonetary punishment, that is, cheap talk.
They found that both regimes increase coop-
eration rates relative to a regular individual
contribution game, but cooperation in the
nonmonetary punishment treatment declines
faster. Cheap talk was not enough to maintain
contribution levels as the players learned there
was ‘‘no bite behind the bark.’’ In addition, if
both monetary and nonmonetary sanctions
were available, contributions and welfare
increased compared to when only one sanction
is available (Noussair and Tucker 2005).9
Herein, we combine the key elements of the
WGHO and Fehr and Gächter experimental
designs to examine whether cooperation
occurs without third-party enforcement. We
compare this treatment against the lower
and upper benchmarks in a treatment without
voting and one with binding votes. Using
a classic linear public-good game,10 we ob-
serve that cooperation does occur under voting,
but the opportunity to punish is important.
Without this punishment condition, voting
degenerates quickly into cheap talk, and the
rates of cooperation are not substantially
higher compared to a standard public-good
game with individual contributions and with-
out voting. Providing the opportunity to pun-
ish voters who ignore the majority proposal
increases cooperation and efficiency rates sub-
stantially. Our results suggest that punishment
works even under the constraints of an exog-
enous institution, the voting mechanism.
II. THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
A. Theoretical Framework
Following Fehr and Gächter (2000b), we
examine a linear public goods environment.
In the basic framework without punishment
opportunities, each individual i divides her
endowment E into contributions to a public
good, xi (0  xi  E), and a private good,
E  xi. The n members of a group make their
contribution decisions independently and
simultaneously, and the monetary payoff poi
for each member i is
poi 5 E  xi þ aX ;ð1Þ
in which 0 , a , 1 , na, where a is the mar-
ginal per capita return from a contribution to
the public good, and X 5
Pn
k 5 1 xk . The con-
straint on a ensures that the individually opti-
mal contribution to the public good is zero,
although the socially optimal outcome is
6. This observation contrasts the observation of
Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992) that sanctions alone
were not enough to increase cooperation, but sanctions
combined with face-to-face communication were suffi-
cient.
7. Note, however, that Nikiforakis (2004) found that
‘‘counterpunishment,’’ the opportunity of punishing the
punishers, has a strong negative effect on contribution
and efficiency levels in a public-good setup similar to
the one in Fehr and Gächter (2000b).
8. Different punishment rules used inDecker, Stiehler,
and Strobel (2003) also yielded higher contribution levels
but not all of them resulted in higher efficiency.
9. A growing literature has emerged on using rewards
in addition to punishment (Andreoni, Harbaugh, and
Vesterlund 2003; Dickinson 2001; Offerman 2002; Sefton,
Shupp, and Walker 2006). The main findings in this liter-
ature indicate that punishment mechanisms are used more
frequently and are more successful than rewards in several
different settings, but a synergistic effect arises from hav-
ing both mechanisms available. In addition, Walker and
Halloran (2004) reported no difference in contribution
and efficiency levels across treatments with and without
reward and sanction mechanisms in one-shot public-good
games.
10. There are two differences between our experiment
and that of WGHO: we are using a public-good game that
is strategically similar to a common pool resource game
with closed access (as in WGHO) and in our experimental
setup there is merely one element in the core—no coalition
smaller than the entire group can agree on a proposal that
would make them better off compared to the noncooper-
ative case and could win a vote. In WGHO, a minimum
winning coalition other than the entire group can form,
and WGHO examined whether this coalition would settle
for an outcome that maximizes the payoffs for the mem-
bers of the majority but puts the members of the minority
at a disadvantage.
achieved when all group members contribute
their entire endowments to the public good.
When a punishment mechanism is added to
the voting scheme, a group member can be
punished by one or more peers if she deviates
from an agreed-upon contribution scheme.
Using the specific punishment mechanism of
Fehr and Gächter (2000b), we define ci,j as
the punishment that member i imposes on
nonabiding member j, with 0  ci,j  10 and
ci,j an integer, and we define f(ci,j) as the fee
function that indicates how much member i
pays to be able to punish nonabiding member
j, whereby f(ci,j) is positive and strictly increas-
ing in ci,j. With fi 5
Pn
j 5 1;i 6¼j f ðci;jÞ, a member
abiding by the scheme receives the payoff:
pi 5 p
o
i  fi:ð2Þ
A nonabiding group member—a cheater—
can be punished by other group members
reducing her payoff. We cap punishment pi 5
(1  ci/10) at 100% of the income, whereby
ci 5
Pn
j 5 1;i6¼j cj;i indicates the total amount
others have contributed to punish member i.
The payoff of i can then be written as:
pi 5 pipoi  fi if ci  10
or
pi 5  fi if ci . 10:
ð3Þ
An aggregate punishment of ci decreases
i’s earnings by ci  10% provided that ci does
not exceed 10. If ci exceeds 10, group member
i loses all of his or her earnings (but not
more if he or she does not punish somebody
else).
Because of the fee function fi, a punisher i
can end up with a negative payoff in a given
period, which occurs when a proposal wins
a majority vote, at least one other member j
decides to ignore the majority proposal, and
member i chooses to punish j high enough.
Since the focus of this paper is on the voting
institution and the norms it might generate,
and not on punishment per se, we chose a
design that allows punishment only in periods
in which there was a majority vote and for
those members who do not adhere to this ma-
jority vote. We exclude the motives of ‘‘blind
revenge’’ (Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner
1992) or raising one’s own relative payoff by
‘‘punishing’’ others independent from their
contributions (Saijo and Nakamura 1995).
B. Experimental Design
One hundred and forty students from St.
LawrenceUniversity participated in a comput-
erized public goods experiment with four
treatments in 14 sessions.11 The parameters
chosen for each period areE 5 10 tokens, mar-
ginal return a 5 0.4, and number of group
members n 5 5.
Table 1 shows the fee function fi 5 f(ci,j) for
the punishment mechanism, which is the same
as in Fehr and Gächter (2000b) and Masclet
et al. (2003). Each punishment point decreases
the earnings of the subject for that period by
10%. For example, if one subject punishes
another subject with five points, the punished
subject lost 50% of her earnings in that period
(plus whatever she lost due to punishment
from other group members), while the pun-
isher lost nine tokens in this period.
Other features of the experimental design
include the following: only if a subject decides
to punish a cheater, can he or she lose tokens
in that period; a subject can always avoid
being punished by adhering to the majority
proposal; a subject can always avoid getting
a negative payoff in a period by not punishing
any cheaters; and if no proposal gets amajority
vote, no one can be punished in that period.
Also, a group stays the same throughout the
experiment (the ‘‘partner’’ design).
The experiment has four treatments: individ-
ual contribution baseline, binding vote, nonbind-
ing vote, and nonbinding vote with punishment.
Each treatment consists of two 10-period
stages. In the first stage, subjects play an
operational game—a standard public goods
TABLE 1
Punishment Level and Associated Costs
Punishment ci,j for
group member j
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Costs f(ci,j) for
group member i
0 1 2 4 6 9 12 16 20 25 30
11. A session of the experiment lasted on average 95
min, including reading the instructions. The exchange rate
is 10 tokens 5 $0.60, and subjects earned on average
$19.50. Vivek Bachhawat wrote all programs for this
experiment. Fehr and Gächter (2000b) and other public
goods experiments have been conducted on ‘‘z-tree,’’
developed by Fischbacher (1999).
contribution game—that is identical across
treatments. The second stage varies across
the four treatments to examine the impact
of voting with punishment on behavior in
the public-good game. As in Fehr andGächter
(2000b), subjects are unaware at the beginning
of each treatment that there will be an addi-
tional ten periods after Period 10 ended.
Individual-Contribution-Baseline Treatment.
Group members continue to play the opera-
tional game in the second stage of the treat-
ment. There are no changes in institutional
rules across stages, only a brief pause
between stages to mimic the other treatments
(the subjects do not know during Periods 1–
10 that they would play an identical game in
Periods 11–20). The structure of this treat-
ment can be summarized like this (O repre-
sents the operational game):
Periods 1–10 Periods 11–20
Individual Contributions O, O, . . ., O O, O, . . ., O
Binding-Vote Treatment. In each period in
Stage 2, every group member can electroni-
cally make a proposal on how much members
should contribute to the public good. Once
proposals are made, they are listed anony-
mously on the computer screen, whereby iden-
tical proposals by different members are listed
only once. Group members then vote for one
of the proposals. If a proposal receives three or
more votes, it is automatically imposed on the
group members. If no proposal is made or no
proposal receives an absolute majority, then
(and only then) the operational game is
played. The structure of this treatment can
be summarized like this (V represents the vot-
ing stage, and letters in parentheses indicate
that the stage might not be played in that
period):
Periods 1–10 Periods 11–20
Binding vote O, O, . . ., O V (O), V (O), . . ., V (O)
Nonbinding–Vote Treatment. Subjects confront
the same framework as in the binding-vote treat-
ment except that the vote is nonbinding—a pro-
posal that receives a majority vote is not
imposed on group members, rather members
only observe the voting results prior to playing
the operational game. The structure of this treat-
ment can be summarized like this:
Periods 1–10 Periods 11–20
Nonbinding vote O, O, . . ., O V O, V O, . . ., V O
Nonbinding-Vote-with-Punishment Treatment.
As in the nonbinding–vote treatment, Stage 2
has group members making proposals, voting,
and playing the operational game. But while
the vote is still not binding, this treatment
introduces a punishment opportunity—group
members can now punish others in the group
who do not adhere to a majority voting out-
come. If no proposal gets a majority vote,
no one can be punished in that period. The
structure of this treatment can be summarized
like this (P represents the punishment stage):
Periods
1–10
Periods
11–20
Nonbinding vote
with punishment
O, O, . . ., O V O (P), V O (P), . . .,
V O (P)
Six groups participated in the individual-
contribution-baseline treatment, six groups
in the binding-vote treatment, eight groups in
the nonbinding–vote treatment, and eight groups
in the nonbinding-vote-with-punishment treat-
ment. Each group consisted of five subjects.
With four treatments, six pairwise compar-
isons of cooperation and efficiency are possi-
ble. The individual-contribution-baseline and
binding-vote treatments are the baseline treat-
ments. Since previous work has shown limited
and declining cooperation in the basic public-
good game (e.g., Ostrom 2000) and signifi-
cantly greater cooperation in the presence of
a binding voting mechanism (WGHO), we
expect that these two treatments set the lower
and upper contribution benchmarks against
which we compare the impact of the voting/
punishment rules.
A theoretical difference also exists between
the second stage of the binding-vote treatment
and the other three treatments: the binding-
vote treatment is the only treatment with
multiple subgame-perfect equilibriums, one
of which consists of efficient contributions
in each period. In the subgame-perfect equilib-
riums of the other three treatments, nobody
contributes in any period since the dominant
strategy in the last period is not to contribute
and, in the nonbinding-vote-with-punishment
treatment, not to punish.
III. RESULTS: CONTRIBUTIONS
Figure 1 provides an initial overview of the
aggregate group contributions by stage and
treatment. We first review Stage 1 (Periods
1–10), in which subjects participated in the
operational game across all four treatments.
Observed behavior in Stage 1 of each treat-
ment replicates the general findings reported
in the literature (Ostrom 2000): contribution
levels are greater than the theoretically pre-
dicted zero, and although levels decline over
time they remain above zero. Group members
initially contributed about 46% of their
endowments (23 tokens) to the public good
and decreased contributions to about 27%
(13 tokens) in Period 10. Mann-Whitney tests
found that contribution levels in the baseline
stage are statistically equivalent across the
four treatments.
In Stage 2 (Periods 11–20), subjects were
introduced to one of four treatment variables:
individual contribution baseline, binding vote,
nonbinding vote, and nonbinding vote with
punishment. Figure 1 provides a general illus-
tration of the relative impact of each treatment
variable on contribution levels. A preliminary
review reveals substantial variation in contri-
bution levels across treatments. As Figure 1
illustrates, the restart of the individual contri-
bution baseline setting temporarily increases
contribution levels similar to those observed
at the beginning of Stage 1 (45%), but contri-
butions return to levels observed at the end of
Stage 1 within four periods and continue to
decline to 13% at the end of Stage 2.12 In
the binding-vote treatment, groups initially
contributed about 90% of their endowments
to the public good, and the level of contribu-
tions remained high throughout Stage 2,
reaching 100% in the final three periods.
The nonbinding–vote treatment yielded con-
tribution levels that correspond closely to
those observed in the individual-contributions
treatment—after an initial increase, contribu-
tion levels fell to 35% within three periods and
to 23% by the end of Stage 2. Contributions in
the nonbinding-vote-with-punishment treatment
initially reached about 80% of group endow-
ments and remained at or above this level
throughout Stage 2.
Figure 1 illustrates two primary issues: the
relative impact the treatment variables have
on contribution levels and whether any effect
is transitory or not. We address these issues
FIGURE 1
Aggregate Group Contributions
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12. The observation that restarting a public-good
experiment, even with the same groups, briefly increases
cooperation is not a new result. See Figure 1 in Isaac
and Walker (1988). More recently, Cookson (2000)
observed that contribution levels returned on average to
about 50% after each of three restarts in a repeated linear
public-good game similar to ours.
with a between- and within-treatment analysis
estimating panel models that control for sub-
ject- and round-specific effects. The between-
treatment analysis estimates the treatment
effects on contribution levels with the follow-
ing model:
Cit 5 b0 þ
X3
j 5 1
bjTreatmentjþ1
þ wt þ xi þ eit;
i 5 1; 2; . . . ;N ; t 5 1; 2; . . . ; T
ð4Þ
where the dependent variable, Cit, denotes the
ith subject’s contribution to the public good in
period t; Treatmentj is a set of three dummy
variables (baseline omitted) representing
which treatment the ith subject participated
in; wt captures time-specific effects on contri-
butions; xi captures individual subject effects;
b0 is the constant term; and eit represents the
contemporaneous error term.13 The model is
estimated using only data from Stage 2 since
no treatment variation exists in Stage 1.
Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients
from Equation (4).
We extend the between-treatment analysis
with a similar within-treatment analysis to
more fully explore whether any treatment
effect is transitory or not. We estimate Equa-
tion (4) for each treatment separately using
data from Stages 1 and 2, which provides
within-treatment estimates of treatment
effects. For the within-treatment estimates,
the three treatment dummy variables fall
out of the model, and the vector of period
dummies is central to addressing two primary
questions. First, estimates provide additional
evidence of treatment effects by estimating rel-
ative contribution levels between the baseline
(Stage 1) and the treatment (Stage 2) set-
tings.14 Second, estimates reveal whether con-
tribution levels vary over time within the
baseline and treatment settings. We expect,
from previous research, that estimates will
reveal a decline in contribution levels in Stage
1 and that estimates from Stage 2 will indicate
whether any treatment effect is transitory or
not.15 Table 3 reports the within-treatment
panel estimates.
The binding-vote treatment introduced
a voting mechanism that automatically imple-
ments the outcome established by a majority
vote. The between-treatment estimates
reported in Table 2 indicate that the binding
vote rules had a highly significant impact on
contributions (p , 0.001), with subjects con-
tributing 6.7 more tokens (from an endow-
ment of 10) in the binding-vote treatment
than the individual contribution baseline.
Estimates from the within-treatment model
confirm this result by finding that individual
contributions in the binding vote setting
(Stage 2) are significantly greater than those
in the Stage 1 baseline setting (p , 0.001)
but also reveal the highly significant difference
persisted over all ten periods of Stage
2—implying that the treatment effect is signif-
icant and permanent. Results indicate that
groups generally identified the socially opti-
mal outcome, and the binding vote mechanism
led to the realization of that outcome. This
finding is consistent with the results from
WGHO.
Binding vote result: Binding voting significantly
and permanently increased contributions to the
public good.
TABLE 2
Between-Treatment Individual Contribution
Analysis
Coefficient p Value
Constant 3.37 0.000
Binding vote 6.70 0.000
Nonbinding vote 1.14 0.027
Nonbinding vote
with punishment
5.66 0.000
v2 1,400
N 276.02
(p , 0.0001)
Notes: Dependent variable is individual contribution,
panel estimates with individual and round effects. Model
is estimated using data from Stage 2 (Rounds 11–20) in
which treatments vary.
13. Due to subjects participating in a single treatment,
subject-specific heterogeneity is modeled as random
effects.
14. This within-treatment estimate of treatment
effects complements the between-treatment estimate by
enabling period-specific effects to differ across treatments.
15. We omit Period 10 from the vector of period dum-
mies so estimates show how the introduction of the treat-
ment variable in Period 11 impacts contributions, while
also showing whether any initial treatment effect persists
(i.e., returns to Period 10 levels).
Voting outcomes, however, may not be
enforceable. Nonbinding voting might act as
a coordination mechanism that directs group
members to voluntarily follow the majority’s
preferences. But then again, such voting
may be cheap talk that has no impact on
actual behavior. The nonbinding–vote treat-
ment explores this by introducing a voting
mechanism identical to the binding–vote treat-
ment except that the majority determined out-
come is not automatically implemented; rather
it is simply announced.
Results from Table 2 suggest that nonbind-
ing voting has a relatively small, although sta-
tistically significant (p 5 0.027), effect on
contributions. Estimates indicate that subjects
contributed about one more token in the non-
binding–vote treatment than in the individual
contribution baseline. However, the within-
treatment estimates in Table 3 elaborate on
this result by showing that while contributions
do significantly increase with the introduction
of the nonbinding voting rules, contributions
eventually return to levels statistically equiva-
lent to those observed in the final round of the
Stage 1 baseline. While the nonbinding–vote
treatment allowed groups to identify the
socially optimal outcome and may have pro-
vided temporary support for greater contribu-
tions, it failed to provide sufficient incentives
for any lasting impact on contribution levels.
Nonbinding vote result: A nonbinding voting
mechanism increased contributions to the pub-
lic good marginally and temporarily, and the
contributions were significantly lower than with
the binding-vote mechanism.
The weak performance of nonbinding vot-
ing seems to be due to a lack of commitment,
TABLE 3
Within-Treatment Individual Contribution Analysis
Individual Contributions Binding Vote Nonbinding Vote
Nonbinding Vote
With Punishment
Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z
Constant 2.300*** 4.604 3.033** 6.323 2.425*** 5.713 2.775*** 5.668
Period 1 2.033*** 3.799 1.367*** 2.208 2.425*** 4.040 1.725*** 2.864
Period 2 2.467*** 4.609 2.000* 3.231 1.475** 2.457 1.400** 2.325
Period 3 1.767*** 2.678 1.033 1.669 2.050*** 3.415 1.475*** 2.449
Period 4 1.433*** 2.678 0.900 1.454 1.100* 1.832 0.700 1.162
Period 5 0.767 1.433 0.633 1.023 2.050*** 3.415 1.250** 2.076
Period 6 1.567*** 2.927 0.767 1.239 0.625 1.041 0.900 1.494
Period 7 0.833 0.852 0.967 1.562 1.250** 2.082 0.975 1.619
Period 8 0.100 0.187 0.100 0.162 1.050* 1.749 0.050 0.083
Period 9 0.200 0.375 0.167 0.269 0.100 0.167 0.700 1.162
Period 10 — — — — — — — —
Period 11 2.100*** 3.924 5.967*** 9.639 3.375*** 5.622 4.975*** 8.261
Period 12 1.500*** 2.803 5.900*** 9.531 2.000*** 3.332 4.600*** 7.638
Period 13 0.767 1.433 6.967*** 11.254 1.050* 1.749 6.200*** 10.295
Period 14 0.067 0.125 6.200*** 10.016 1.700*** 2.832 4.700*** 7.804
Period 15 0.133 0.249 6.967*** 11.254 1.200** 1.999 6.225*** 10.336
Period 16 0.200 0.374 5.633*** 9.100 1.100* 1.832 5.125*** 8.510
Period 17 0.267 0.498 3.967*** 6.408 1.350** 2.249 5.425*** 9.008
Period 18 0.733 1.370 6.967*** 11.254 0.850 1.416 6.400*** 10.627
Period 19 0.333 0.623 6.967*** 11.254 0.450 0.750 5.925*** 9.838
Period 20 1.000* 1.869 6.967*** 11.254 0.125 0.208 5.100*** 8.468
v2 128.57 (p , 0.0001) 845.89 (p , 0.0001) 78.23 (p , 0.0001) 609.52 (p , 0.0001)
N 600 600 800 800
Notes: Dependent variable is individual contributions, panel estimates with random individual effects. Stage 1 consists
of Periods 1–10 and represents the within-treatment baseline, while Stage 2 consists of Periods 11–20 and introduces the
treatment variable. Period 10 is omitted and therefore represents the baseline period, which indicates the change in con-
tributions within and across stages. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
and not a lack of sophistication. In the initial
period, members of six groups proposed and
voted for the socially optimal contribution
plan, and the other two groups did so within
four periods. Of the 80 opportunities, 54 cases
resulted in a proposal receiving a majority
vote, in which 44 of the 54 were the socially
optimal plan. This is further illustrated by
comparing actual contributions to proposed
contributions receiving a majority vote. Pro-
posals receiving majority votes entailed an
average group contribution of 45.8—close to
the optimal 50—while the actual average con-
tribution was 18.6 (Table 4). Right from the
start in Period 11, a majority of group mem-
bers cheated on the proposed contribution
plan.While the voting allowed groups to express
and learn what was best for them, it failed to
deter individual members from deviating from
the optimal plan. This finding contrasts the siz-
able effect reported with verbal communication,
another form of cheap talk (e.g., see General
Finding 5 in Ostrom 2000 or the findings in
Bochet, Page, and Putterman 2006), and is also
inconsistent with the results in voting-on-tax
experiments, but it is in line with the small
effect voting had on public-good contribu-
tions in Messer, Kaiser, and Schulze (2005).
While it may be impossible to compel
groups to adhere to a voting outcome, it
may be doable for group members to punish
other members. The final treatment therefore
introduces punishment into the nonbinding
voting mechanism to examine whether punish-
ment can provide the incentives necessary to
enable nonbinding voting to match binding
vote rules. Results from Table 2 confirm our
initial impressions from Figure 1 that punish-
ment may have a highly significant positive
effect on contributions in a nonbinding voting
setting. First, estimates suggest that contribu-
tions to the public good were significantly
greater in the nonbinding-vote-with-punishment
treatment relative to the baseline (p , 0.001).
Specifically, subjects contributed 5.66 more
tokens in the nonbinding-vote-with-punishment
treatment than the individual contribution
baseline. But estimates also indicate that con-
tributions in the nonbinding-vote-with-
punishment treatmentwere significantly greater
than those in the nonbinding vote (without
punishment) treatment (p , 0.001). Results
from the within-treatment models reported
in Table 3 confirm punishment’s significant
effect on contributions when voting is not
binding. Estimates show that contributions
were significantly greater in the nonbinding
vote with punishment setting (Stage 2) than
in the final round of the baseline setting (Stage
1).More importantly, estimates also show that
the highly significant positive effect on contri-
butions persists until the final periods of Stage
2. Results indicate that the threat of punish-
ment may provide a sufficient incentive to
match the benefits of a binding vote mecha-
nism, which implies that punishment may suf-
fice when an enforceable vote is infeasible.
Punishment result: Nonbinding voting with the
opportunity to punish cheaters significantly and
permanently increased contribution levels to the
public good, with a magnitude similar to the
effect from the binding vote mechanism.
Similar to observations in Fehr and
Gächter (2000b), voting with the fear of
TABLE 4
Cheating and Punishment in Nonbinding Vote and Nonbinding Vote With Punishment
Nonbinding Vote Nonbinding Vote With Punishment
Stage 2 Final Period Stage 2 Final Period
Average aggregate contribution
level of majority proposal
45.8 42.5 48.6 50.0
Average actual contribution level
(when there was a majority proposal)
21.2 12.7 44.4 41.7
Average actual contribution
level (all periods)
18.6 11.5 41.2 39.5
Average number of cheaters 3.34 4.33 0.54 0.86
Average number of punishers – – 2.84 3.00
Average punishment per cheater – – 4.32 4.00
Average punishment costs per punisher – – 2.34 1.60
punishment seems to outweigh the motives
that drive cheating. With punishment, group
members not only propose and vote for
socially optimal contribution plans but they
also follow through on the plan. As Table 4
reports, proposals with and without punish-
ment did not differ much (48.6 vs. 45.8), but
actual contributions differed dramatically
(41.2 vs. 18.6). Correspondingly, the number
of cheaters differed substantially (0.54 vs.
3.34).
The impact on voting with potential pun-
ishment arises even though punishing itself
is not an individually optimal strategy since
subjects should free ride on others’ willingness
to punish cheaters. We observe that voters do
consistently contribute to the punishment
public good. When cheating occurred, 2.8 of
five subjects on average were willing to incur
between 1.5 and 3.4 tokens in punishment fees.
Even in the last period, when there were no
apparent reputation advantages from punish-
ment, three of five group members were still
willing to bear punishment costs.
IV. RESULTS: EFFICIENCY
Achieving cooperation under voting with
punishment is a success, but it comes at a cost
because punishment reduces the net returns to
both the punisher and the punished. The open
question is whether the gains of adding the
punishment mechanism to the voting scheme
exceed the costs such that overall efficiency
is improved. For example, Fehr and Gächter
(2000b) found in their ‘‘stranger’’ experimen-
tal treatment with randomly changing group
members that the increased contribution to
the public good does not compensate for the
costs of the punishment tool until the next-
to-last period. In their ‘‘partner’’ treatment
with fixed groups, which is more comparable
to our experimental setup, efficiency loss
occurred in the first three periods of the pun-
ishment condition. Decker, Stiehler, and Stro-
bel (2003) also found that some punishment
rules had positive and others had negative
effects on efficiency.
For purpose of comparison between the
treatments, we define efficiency as the percent-
age of potential payoff realized by the group.
It corresponds to payoffs in the nonpunish-
ment treatments and may differ with the intro-
duction of costly punishment.
Figure 2 shows the average group payoffs
including punishment costs in Stage 2 for each
treatment; Figure 3 shows the same for peri-
ods in which a proposal was accepted by
a majority of voters (since the individual-
contributions treatment did not include a vot-
ing scheme, we omit the payoffs from the
treatment in Figure 3). As expected, binding
voting achieves the greatest efficiency. The
question is whether voting without or with
punishment leads to greater efficiency gains.
Examination of the individual data reveals
FIGURE 2
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that efficiency is significantly greater when
nonbinding voting is supplemented with pun-
ishment (p , 0.0001).16 The cost of punish-
ment is more than recovered with gains
provided by adding punishment to voting.
Punishment efficiency result: Given our param-
eters, the gains realized from adding the threat
of punishment exceed the costs of the punish-
ment, and therefore nonbinding voting with
punishment achieves significantly greater effi-
ciency than without punishment and ap-
proaches similar efficiency levels observed
with binding voting.
Voting with punishment generates substan-
tial gains as players gain experience. While the
efficiency gains in the first period of Stage 2 are
about 80% regardless of the treatment, things
quickly diverge. With punishment, the non-
binding voting maintains efficiency above
80%; without punishment efficiency drops to
about 65%.
Our results suggest a stronger efficiency
effect from punishment than observed in Fehr
and Gächter (2000b). Figure 4 presents effi-
ciency gain and loss of the treatment with pun-
ishment opportunities as the difference
between average payoffs in the nonbinding-
vote-with-punishment and nonbinding–vote
treatments, normalized by the average payoffs
in the nonbinding–vote treatment. For com-
parison, the corresponding graph for the part-
ner treatment from Fehr andGächter (1999) is
replicated.17 While a statistically rigorous
comparison between the two efficiency curves
is inappropriate due to differences between the
experiments, Figure 4 paints a clear picture:
the punishment mechanism has an even stron-
ger effect on efficiency in public-good experi-
ments when the contribution levels are
determined by a (even nonbinding) majority
vote than when determined individually, as
in the experiment of Fehr and Gächter.18 This
could be due to a stronger social norm
imposed through a vote—it is implicitly
expected that everybody contributes to the
public good as in a individual contribution
game, but now this expectation has been
FIGURE 3
Average Group Payoffs as Indication of Efficiency (for Periods With Majority Proposals Only)
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Periods
A
ve
ra
ge
 G
ro
up
 P
ay
of
fs
Binding-Vote
Non-Binding-Vote
Non-Binding-Vote-With-Punishment
16. Wilcoxon tests comparing Treatment 3 (nonbind-
ing) and Treatment 4 (nonbinding with punishment)
revealed that efficiencywas statistically equivalent in Stage
1 (z 50.113; p 5 0.91) while being significantly different
in Stage 2 (z 5 11.316; p , 0.0001).
17. Fehr and Gächter (1999) is the working paper on
which Fehr and Gächter (2000b) is based. The graph,
which is part of Figure 6 in the working paper, was not
shown in the journal version of the paper; we thank Simon
Gächter for sharing the average efficiency data from that
figure with us. We also thank a referee for making us
aware of this graph.
18. Small or nonexistent efficiency gains from punish-
ment have been observed in other experiments similar to
Fehr and Gächter (2000b) as well. See, for example, Fig-
ure 7 in Nikiforakis (2004) or Figure 2 in Noussair and
Tucker (2005).
stated explicitly and is out in the open for
everybody to see.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Groups commonly use a voting mechanism
to provide public goods—group members
offer alternative options, and then they vote
on which option to implement, if any (e.g.,
global climate change, OPEC and the oil out-
put level, and villagers and fishing quota). In
many situations, however, no external
enforcement mechanism exists to guarantee
that each member adheres to the majority pro-
posal. The group must find an internal
enforcement mechanism to discipline or pun-
ish those who ignore the majority proposal.
The problem is that punishment itself is a pub-
lic good—each member wants to see the non-
cooperator(s) punished but their rational
strategy is to free ride on another’s punish-
ment efforts. According to this theory, in
the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game
nobody punishes deviators, and therefore it
is rational to deviate from the majority vote.
Adding an explicit punishment mechanism
to a nonbinding voting mechanism should
not help improve cooperation.
This paper provides evidence that voting
alone as a tool of cooperation and communi-
cation is not enough; many subjects quickly
realize that nonbinding votes are cheap talk,
so they deviate from what the group majority
decides. This result is consistent with Messer,
Kaiser, and Schulze (2005) who also find that
voting alone does not make a difference in a
voluntary contribution mechanism game. But
when group members—that is, voters—are
able to punish cheaters, our results suggest
that cooperation can be sustained on a higher
level than without punishment opportunities.
This result supports the findings of Fehr and
Gächter (2000a, 2000b) that punishment
opportunities discipline group members and
help establish group norms that extend into
the last period of a repeated game even though
it is individually rational to forgo punishment
and to free ride on other members’ punish-
ment efforts. Greater cooperation, however,
does not necessarily translate into greater effi-
ciency.More cooperation comes at a cost since
adding the punishment tool to voting reduces
the returns to both the cheater and the pun-
isher. But while efficiency decreased in the
treatment with punishment relative to the
binding-vote treatment, we find that it was sig-
nificantly greater relative to the nonbinding–
vote treatment. The efficiency gain from pun-
ishment in the voting institution is large com-
pared to results in Fehr and Gächter (1999,
2000b) and other experiments in which pun-
ishment opportunities are added to an individ-
ual contribution scheme without vote.
Important questions remain for future
work: do these results hold for nonlinear
FIGURE 4
Average Payoff Gain of the Punishment Treatment Relative to the Nonpunishment Treatment
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
PeriodR
el
at
iv
e 
pa
yo
ff 
ga
in
 o
f t
he
pu
ni
sh
m
en
t c
on
di
tio
n
Non-Binding-Vote-With-Punishment
Relative to Non-Binding-Vote
Fehr/Gächter Partner Condition
public goods and for minimum winning coali-
tions smaller than the grand coalition and do
they transfer to setups with heterogeneous
groups? In many real-world situations, the rel-
evant choice is not only between whether to
join the entire group versus free riding but
what coalition within the group to form and
join. The negotiations following Kyoto again
serve as an example.19 But when agreements
are nonbinding, an additional trade-off
appears: members of the minority in a 3–2 vote
might be required to contribute more to the
public good according to the majority pro-
posal, which makes them less inclined to fol-
low the proposal even if punishment
opportunities exist. This behavior could give
rise to unanimous decisions even if the mem-
bers of a minimum winning coalition are bet-
ter off compared to the members of a grand
coalition.
In addition, recent experimental papers
found significant differences in behavior and
efficiency between homogeneous and hetero-
geneous groups (Cherry, Kroll, and Shogren
2005; Kroll, Cherry, and Shogren forthcom-
ing; Margreiter, Sutter, and Dittrich 2005).
In their common-pool-resource experiment
with binding votes, Margreiter, Sutter, and
Dittrich observed that heterogeneous groups
have a more difficult time to agree on and vote
for a single proposal. This reduces the effi-
ciency for such groups: even though whenever
a proposal is adopted by a heterogeneous
group, efficiency is much greater than if group
members decide individually. An open empir-
ical question is what will happen when punish-
ment opportunities are added to a nonbinding
voting scheme with heterogeneous groups.
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